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Spoliation of Evidence

PROPOSALS FOR NEW YORK STATE

*

The destruction of evidence, commonly known as
spoliation, has become an increasing problem in civil litigation
today.1 Commentators have noted that “we live in an era of
spoliation”2
and
that
“deliberate
obstructionism
is
commonplace.”3 One study indicates that approximately onehalf of litigators consider spoliation a frequent or regular
occurrence.4 Another study points to actual incentives to alter
evidence pending trial.5 Spoliation has also been at the center
of recent, well-publicized criminal cases involving Martha
Stewart6 and Arthur Andersen.7 While the manner of
*
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MARGARET M. KOESEL, DAVID A. BELL & TRACEY L. TURNBULL, SPOLIATION
OF EVIDENCE: SANCTIONS AND REMEDIES FOR DESTRUCTION OF EVIDENCE IN CIVIL
LITIGATION xi (2000) (characterizing spoliation as an “unfortunate reality of modernday civil litigation”).
2
Gregory P. Joseph, Rule Traps, LITIG. A.B.A, Vol. 30, No.1, at 9 (Fall 2003)
(noting that “parties long not so much for documentary evidence as for evidence that
documents have been destroyed”).
3
Edward J. Imwinkelried, A New Antidote for an Opponent’s Pretrial
Discovery Misconduct: Treating the Misconduct at Trial as an Admission by Conduct of
the Weakness of the Opponent’s Case, 1993 BYU L. Rev. 793, 794 (1993).
4
Terry R. Spencer, Do Not Fold Spindle or Mutilate: The Trend Towards the
Recognition of Spoliation as a Separate Tort, 30 IDAHO L. REV. 37, 39 (1993).
5
Charles R. Nesson, Incentives to Spoliate Evidence in Civil Litigation: The
Need for Vigorous Judicial Action, 13 CARDOZO L. REV. 793, 795 (1991) (claiming that
much incentive to spoliate exists because spoliation is unlikely to be discovered).
6
Martha Stewart was found guilty of conspiracy, obstruction of justice and
two counts of making false statements over the sale of 4,000 shares of ImClone
Systems stock. See Martha Stewart Found Guilty on all Counts, March 6, 2004,
available at http://www.cnn.com/2004/LAW/03/05/ stewart.main/ (last visited Feb. 21,
2005). The obstruction charge included the “altering of evidence” involving allegedly
altered phone logs and notes to which Ms. Stewart had access. See Constance L. Hays,
1
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spoliation—from deleting e-mails to shredding documents—
may differ, its effect on the underlying case is the same: loss of
evidence prevents a party from adequately proving or
defending a claim at trial.8 Furthermore, destruction of
evidence violates the spirit of liberal discovery, offends notions
of fair play, and generally undermines the efficacy of the
adversarial system.9
In response to spoliation, courts have developed an
array of remedies against the spoliator including sanctions,
adverse inference instructions, criminal penalties and even a
separate tort of spoliation.10 However, the use of such remedies
varies widely across jurisdictions,11 causing a variety of
problems as courts fail to agree on choice-of-law principles
when spoliation issues emerge.12
Two particular problems have developed with the New
York courts’ approach to remedying spoliation. First, New York
courts employ the remedy of the adverse inference instruction
with little, if any, regard to its potentially drastic effects. The
instruction, which asks a jury to view the destroyed evidence as
inherently adverse to the spoliator’s case, is apt to produce
unduly harsh consequences, especially when the spoliator is

Prosecutor Says Martha Stewart Spun Web of Lies About Shares, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 28,
2004, at C1.
7
The accounting firm Arthur Andersen, LLP was convicted for criminal
obstruction of justice under the United States Code (U.S.C.). Andersen was found
guilty of destroying accounting documents (paper and electronic) pertaining to its
troubled client, the Enron Corporation. At the time the documents were destroyed,
Andersen was aware that the Securities and Exchange Commission was investigating
Enron. See generally John Chase, To Shred or Not to Shred: Document Retention
Policies and Federal Obstruction of Justice Statutes, 8 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 721
(2003).
8
See Spencer, supra note 4, at 38.
9
Randi D. Bandman & Jay M. Du Nesme, Recent Developments in the Area
of Spoliation of Evidence, SCO1 A.L.I.-A.B.A. CONTINUING LEGAL EDUC. 463, 465 (July
1997) (describing how “destruction of evidence undermines the integrity of the legal
system, a system that was designed to promote a society that expects that its citizens
will take responsibility for and own up to their actions.”).
10
Jeffrey S. Kinsler & Anne R. Keyes MacIver, Demystifying Spoliation of
Evidence, 34 TORT & INS. L.J. 761, 774-75 (1999). See discussion infra Part III.
11
David A. Bell, Margaret M. Koesel & Tracey L. Turnbull, Let’s Level the
Playing Field: A New Proposal for Spoliation of Evidence Claims in Pending Litigation,
29 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 769, 791 (1997) (“Thus far, judicial treatment of spoliation claims
arising in the context of pending litigation has been inconsistent.”).
12
CHARLES T. MCCORMICK ET AL., MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 265, at 193-94
(John W. Strong ed., 4th ed. 1992) [hereinafter MCCORMICK] (“This area of the law
appears to be in the process of rather rapid change, although the patterns of the new
order are not yet entirely clear.”).
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merely negligent.13 For example, a jury may find against a
spoliator merely because he altered evidence and not because
he was liable in the underlying suit. A Southern District of
New York court noted that the “adverse inference instruction
often ends litigation—it is too difficult a hurdle for the spoliator
to overcome.”14 Until New York state courts recognize this
hurdle, they risk unjustly penalizing spoliation parties.
Second, New York does not recognize a separate tort for
spoliation by first parties15 and has recognized the tort by third
parties in only a handful of cases.16 In defense of this position,
the state courts believe that the traditional remedies are
adequate in addressing the destruction of evidence.17 While this
may hold true for first-party spoliation, it does not for thirdparty spoliation. Because third-party spoliators are not
recognized by the court as parties to a lawsuit, they are beyond

13

See Mary Kay Brown & Paul D. Weiner, Digital Dangers: A Primer on
Electronic Evidence in the Wake of Enron, 74 PA. B.A.Q. 1, 7 (Jan. 2003) (listing “severe
sanctions, such as adverse inference instructions” imposed by courts when “relevant
electronic evidence was not preserved, or was intentionally destroyed”).
14
See Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC, 220 F.R.D. 212, 219 (S.D.N.Y. 2003)
(remarking that the adverse inference instruction has an “in terrorem” effect and is an
extreme sanction and should not be given lightly).
15
Spoliation by an opposing party to an actual or potential lawsuit is known
as “first-party” spoliation, while spoliation by a nonparty, (i.e., stranger to the lawsuit)
is referred to as “third-party” spoliation. See generally Fairclough v. Hugo, 616
N.Y.S.2d 944 (App. Div. 1994) (refusing to recognize an independent cause of action for
first-party spoliation where plaintiffs failed to establish that the alleged failure to
preserve evidence would make it extremely difficult or impossible for the plaintiffs to
establish their claim for malpractice); Pharr v. Cortese, 559 N.Y.S.2d 780, 782 (Sup. Ct.
1990) (declining to create a first-party spoliation tort in medical malpractice case
unless duty to preserve evidence exists).
16
Most such cases are limited to instances where an employee sues his
employer for spoliation of evidence and resulting impairment of the employee's claim
against a third-party tortfeasor. See, e.g., Ripepe v. Crown Equip. Corp., 741 N.Y.S.2d
64 (App. Div. 2002); Curran v. Auto Lab Serv. Ctr., 721 N.Y.S.2d 662 (App. Div 2001);
DiDomenico v. C & S Aeromatik Supplies, 682 N.Y.S.2d 452 (App. Div. 1998); Vaughn
v. City of New York, 607 N.Y.S.2d 726 (App. Div. 1994). But see Weigl v. Quincy
Specialties Co., 601 N.Y.S.2d 774, 776 (App. Div. 1993) (declining to recognize a tort of
third-party spoliation where university discarded lab coat in student’s suit against coat
manufacturer). See also discussion of Modified Recognition of Third-Party Spoliation
infra Part IV.C.
17
See, e.g., Simet v. Coleman Co., Inc. 778 N.Y.S.2d 367 (App. Div. 2004)
(rejecting cause of action for spoliation while noting that court has discretion to impose
sanctions for the destruction of evidence); Metlife Auto & Home v. Joe Basil Chevrolet,
Inc., 753 N.Y.S.2d 272, 282 (App. Div. 2002) (declining to recognize a cause of action for
spoliation of evidence and, instead, relying on “the comparative advantages of
remedying any injury through the imposition of carefully chosen and specifically
tailored sanctions within the context of the underlying action.”); Pharr, 559 N.Y.S.2d at
782 (noting that the traditional sanctions imposed on spolitors are adequate in
remedying victims of spoliation); Weigl, 601 N.Y.S.2d at 775.
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the reach of typical remedies available to such parties.18 New
York courts are thus unable to sanction third parties.19 In spite
of these policies, or perhaps because of them, many plaintiffs
continue to bring claims asking New York courts to recognize a
separate cause of action for spoliation. With few exceptions,
however, the courts continually refuse to recognize such a tort,20
and consequently New York risks allowing such parties to go
unpenalized when they destroy evidence.
Part I of this Note examines the basic elements of
spoliation and discusses when the duty to preserve evidence
arises and how courts determine whether spoliated evidence is
relevant to issues at trial. Part II considers the traditional
remedies employed against spoliation and their respective
shortcomings. This part will give special attention to the
adverse inference instruction, which is the most commonly
used remedy and indeed the most controversial, especially in
view of its potentially drastic effects on the litigating parties.
Part III chronicles the development of the spoliation tort and
analyzes the advantages and inherent problems in recognizing
it. Part IV surveys the status of the treatment of spoliation in
the New York court system, focusing on the state’s use of the
adverse inference instruction as well as its refusal to adopt the
separate tort of spoliation. Finally, in light of emerging trends
in combating spoliation, Part V suggests that New York should
utilize the adverse inference instruction more cautiously and
recognize a separate tort for third-party spoliation.
I.

ELEMENTS OF SPOLIATION

Spoliation is “[t]he intentional destruction of evidence . .
. or the significant and meaningful alteration of a document or
18

See Jonathan Judge, Reconsidering Spoliation: Common-Sense Alternatives
to the Spoliation Tort, 2001 WIS. L. REV. 441, 442. See also Elias v. Lancaster Gen
Hosp., 710 A.2d 65, 67-68 (Pa. Super. 1998) (stating that “traditional remedies would
be unavailing, since the spoliator is not a party to the underlying litigation.”).
19
MetLife Auto & Home, 753 N.Y.S.2d at 276 (App. Div. 2002) (declining to
recognize a duty to preserve evidence as a basis for imposing tort liability for a
negligent or reckless act of spoliation committed by a third party to the underlying
claim where third party made voluntary promise and undertaking to do so). See infra
note 225 and accompanying text.
20
See, e.g., Fairclough v. Hugo, 616, N.Y.S.2d 944 (App. Div. 1994) (referring
to the Pharr decision, rejecting on the facts an independent claim for intentional
spoliation of evidence by a third party (other than by an employer)); Steinman v.
Barclays Bank, 715 N.Y.S.2d 841 (App. Div. 2000) (rejecting on the facts an
independent claim for intentional spoliation of evidence by a third party); Weigl, 601
N.Y.S.2d at 776 (refusing to recognize cause of action for spoliation).
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instrument.”21 Because this definition is somewhat narrow and
may not, for example, include situations where documents have
been routinely discarded, many jurisdictions recognize a
broader definition to include the losing, discarding, or giving
away of evidence.22 New York, for example, broadly defines
spoliation as “the destruction or significant alteration of
evidence or the failure to preserve property for another’s use as
evidence in pending or reasonably foreseeable litigation.”23
Furthermore, though originally identified as the intentional
destruction of evidence, spoliation now includes negligent or
unintentional destruction of evidence.24 Jurisdictions, however,
are not in full agreement as to what constitutes spoliation.25
Some courts are more willing to find instances of spoliation
than others, representing a disagreement among courts as to
the relative importance of a victim’s right to be compensated
and the potential for unduly burdening the alleged spoliator.
Spoliation liability arises from a party’s duty to preserve
evidence.26 For example, the duty automatically emerges when
a party serves or is served with a judicial or administrative
complaint.27 In such a situation, the party has actual knowledge
21

BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1401 (6th ed. 1990) (citation omitted). See also
John K. Stipancich, The Negligent Spoliation of Evidence: An Independent Tort Action
May Be the Only Acceptable Alternative, 53 OHIO STATE L.J. 1135 (1992) (defining
spoliation generally).
22
See Phoebe L. McGlynn, Spoliation in the Products Liability Context, 27 U.
MEM. L. REV. 663, 665 (1997).
23
West v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 167 F.3d 776, 779 (2d Cir. 1999).
24
The Sixth Circuit has arguably adopted the broadest interpretation of
spoliation, stating that “destruction of potentially relevant evidence obviously occurs
along a continuum of fault ranging from innocence through the degrees of negligence to
intentionality.” See Shannon D. Hutchings, Tortious Liability for Spoliation of
Evidence, 24 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 381, 382 (2000) (citing Welsh v. United States, 844
F.2d 1239, 1246 (6th Cir. 1988)).
25
For example, jurisdictions do not agree on whether “concealment” of
evidence constitutes spoliation. See, e.g., Green Leaf Nursery v. E.I. DuPont De
Nemours & Co., 341 F.3d 1292, 1308 (11th Cir. 2003) (concealment does not constitute
spoliation of evidence under Florida law); Nix v. Hoke, 139 F. Supp. 2d 125, 135
(D.D.C. 2001) (concealment and alteration are included in the definition of “willful
destruction of evidence” under Ohio law). This difference is most likely due to the fact
that concealed evidence has not been destroyed and may still be produced at trial. See
Steffen Nolte, The Spoliation Tort: An Approach to Underlying Principles, 26 ST.
MARY’S L. J. 351, 408 (1994).
26
KOESEL, BELL & TURNBULL, supra note 1, at 1.
27
See Scott v. I.B.M. Corp., 196 F.R.D. 233,248-49 (D.N.J. 2000) (noting that
a duty arises to preserve evidence whenever a party has been served with a complaint).
See also Margaret O. Frossard and Neal S. Gainsberg, Spoliation of Evidence in
Illinois: The Law After Boyd v. Traveler’s Insurance Co. [sic], 28 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 685
(1997) (“[A] duty to preserve evidence may arise through an agreement, a contract, a
statute . . . or another special circumstance.”) (citing Boyd v. Travelers Ins. Co., 652
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that litigation has begun and is therefore bound to preserve all
discoverable evidence.28 A majority of courts have also held that
a duty exists as soon as it is “reasonably foreseeable” that a
lawsuit will ensue and that the evidence will be discoverable in
connection with that suit.29 A duty does not arise, then, if
litigation is “merely possible” as opposed to litigation that is
“likely to be commenced.”30 Furthermore, a duty to maintain
evidence may also be imposed by statute, regulation, or the
ethical duties of the profession.31 Finally, the duty may attach if
the party voluntarily assumes such a duty, as when a business
implements a formal document retention policy.32
The duty to preserve electronic evidence under a
document retention policy is particularly troubling in light of
increased reliance on computer data.33 Given the routine
destruction of information stored on computers in the ordinary
course of business pursuant to retention policies,34 it is difficult
N.E.2d 267, 270-71 (Ill. 1995)).
28
Scott, 196 F.R.D. at 249.
29
See Shamis v. Ambassador Factors Corp., 34 F. Supp. 2d 879, 888-89
(S.D.N.Y. 1999); Kronisch v. United States, 150 F.3d 112, 126-27 (2d Cir. 1998)
(destruction of records may be found by a jury to be in anticipation of litigation,
notwithstanding that no litigation, administrative action or congressional investigation
had commenced). Furthermore, the moving party does not need to prove that the actual
person who destroyed the evidence had notice of the litigation. See Testa v. Wal-Mart
Stores, Inc., 144 F.3d 173, 178 (1st Cir. 1998) (“The critical part of the foundation that
must be laid depends on institutional notice—the aggregate knowledge possessed by a
party and its agents, servants and employees.”).
30
Willard v. Caterpillar, Inc., 48 Cal. Rptr. 2d 607, 620-21 (Ct. App. 1995)
(Defendant manufacturer destroyed documents in the ordinary course of business
relating to a thirty-five-year-old product over which it had never been sued. Such
destruction did not constitute spoliation of evidence because, in the court’s view, the
mere possibility of future litigation was not enough.). Turner v. Hudson Transit Lines,
Inc., 142 F.R.D. 68, 73 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (“[T]he obligation to preserve evidence even
arises prior to the filing of a complaint where a party is on notice that litigation is
likely to be commenced.”). Shaffer v. RWP Group, Inc., 169 F.R.D. 19, 24 (E.D.N.Y.
1996) (finding of spoliation where defendant destroyed documents after receiving
complaint which alerted defendant that such documents were relevant and likely to be
sought in discovery). See also Nolte, supra note 25, at 378.
31
KOESEL, BELL & TURNBULL, supra note 1, at 4, 8.
32
Id. at 9.
33
Mark D. Robins, Computers and the Discovery of Evidence – A New
Dimension to Civil Procedure, 17 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 411, 421 (1999)
(describing spoliation of electronic evidence as particularly thorny in the context of
computer-related evidence). See generally Lawyer Lounge, an Internet resource center
focusing on law office technology, which publishes an interactive page on electronic
discovery, at http://lawyerlounge.com/ediscovery (last visited Jan. 20, 2005).
34
In assessing a document retention policy’s legal sufficiency, a court
considers whether it is “reasonable” in light of the nature of the information. See
Kenneth K. Dort & George R. Spatz, Discovery in the Digital Era: Considerations for
Corporate Counsel, 20 No. 9 COMPUTER & INTERNET LAW. 11, Sept. 2003, at 16 (citing
Lewy v. Remington Arms, 836 F.2d 1104 (8th Cir. 1988). For example, if the
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to establish that such destruction amounts to spoliation.35 In
particular, companies have a responsibility to suspend a
document retention policy in the face of litigation to avoid
spoliation charges.36 However, in some circumstances, courts
have noted that this responsibility falls on the victim of alleged
spoliation, thus creating confusion over which party must
protect against routine destruction. The failure to save
electronic evidence, whether before or during discovery, then,
can be extremely harmful to a party’s case.
Courts are generally reluctant to impose a duty to
preserve evidence on third parties because they neither
initiated nor necessitated the lawsuit.37 Such courts generally
concur that imposing such a duty on non-litigants is unfair
since it would interfere with their right to control and dispose
of their personal property.38 However, exceptions to this general
rule include third parties who are already bound to preserve
evidence by statute, contract, agreement, or special
relationship.39 In such instances, courts have held a third party
accountable for spoliation.40
information would likely be the subject of a dispute, it would be unreasonable to
discard this data. Id. (citing Lewy, 836 F.2d at 1112). Second, the court should
determine whether a company instituted the document retention policy in bad faith.
See Patrick Grady, Discovery of Computer Stored Documents and Computer Based
Litigation Support Systems: Why Give Up More than Necessary? 14 J. MARSHALL J.
COMPUTER & INFO. L. 523, 539-40 (1996) (noting that courts look unfavorably at
companies that appear to have instituted policies only to limit the amount of damaging
evidence otherwise available).
35
Ironically, it is very common for a company to have a document retention
policy in place but not to follow it. In Murphy Oil USA, Inc. v. Fluor Daniel, Inc., for
example, the court observed that if the defendant, Fluor, had followed its document
retention policy, the emails subject to the discovery dispute would have been destroyed,
and the issue would have been moot. Murphy Oil USA, Inc. v. Fluor Daniel, Inc., 52
Fed. R. Serv. 3d 168, 171 (E.D. La. 2002). Instead, Fluor’s failure to follow its own
policies resulted in the expenditure of considerable time and money in discovery
disputes over the production of emails that should have been destroyed in the first
place. Id.
36
See Dort & Spatz supra note 35, at 16.
37
Bart S. Wilhoit, Spoliation of Evidence: The Viability of Four Emerging
Torts, 46 UCLA L. REV. 631, 657 (1998). See also discussion of the tort of spoliation in
relation to third parties infra at III.C.
38
For example, numerous courts have held that neither ordinary tort law nor
a state’s workers’ compensation act imposes a duty on employers to preserve evidence
that might be used in an employee’s third-party claim against a product manufacturer
or other defendant. See Maria A. Losavio, Synthesis of Louisiana Law on Spoliation of
Evidence – Compared to the Rest of the Country, Did We Handle It Correctly?, 58 LA. L.
REV. 837, 852 (1998).
39
KOESEL, BELL & TURNBULL, supra note 1, at 12 (citing Koplin v. Rosel Well
Perforators, Inc., 734 P.2d 1177, 1179 (Kan. 1987)).
40
See Johnson v. United Services Automobile Ass’n, 79 Cal. Rptr. 2d 234, 239
(Ct. App. 1998) (recognizing a duty to preserve evidence where the third-party insurer
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Regardless of how the duty to preserve is defined, the
spoliated evidence must still be relevant, discoverable, and
material to a party’s claim.41 A court usually determines
“whether there is any likelihood that the destroyed evidence
would have been of the nature alleged by the party affected by
its destruction.”42 However, the effect of spoliation is, by its very
nature, speculative.43 As one court has noted, “[w]hen
attempting to determine the effect of missing evidence, ‘courts
face the treacherous task of divining the import of materials
whose contents are unknown and, very often, disputed.’”44 The
burden thus falls on the prejudiced party to produce evidence
suggesting that the destroyed evidence was relevant to
substantiating its claim and would have been included in the
case had it not been destroyed.45 Once this burden has been
overcome, a court is then faced with the formidable challenge of
imposing an appropriate remedy.
II.

TRADITIONAL
EVIDENCE

REMEDIES

FOR

THE

SPOLIATION

OF

When evidence is spoliated, courts have imposed
traditional remedies against the spoliating party. These
include an adverse inference instruction and sanctions such as
dismissal, issue preclusion, summary judgment for the
defendant and, in some cases, criminal penalties.46 The remedy
a court chooses is intended to serve three purposes: deterrence,
punishment, and remediation.47 For example, the court in

accepts a specific request to preserve a particular vehicle, thus inducing reliance on the
part of another); Brown v. City of Delray Beach, 652 So. 2d 1150, 1154 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1995) (cause of action upheld against local police department for negligently
disposing of evidence after plaintiff’s attorney had requested access to the evidence
while it was in possession of the police).
41
Kinsler & MacIver, supra note 10, at 768.
42
Kronisch v. United States, 150 F.3d 112, 127 (2d Cir. 1998).
43
See Nolte, supra note 25, at 400 (noting impossibility of ascertaining extent
to which spoliation harmed underlying action).
44
Robert D. Peltz, The Necessity of Redefining Spoliation of Evidence
Remedies in Florida, 29 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1289, 1337 (2002) (citing Arizona v.
Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51, 57-58 (1988) (citations omitted)).
45
Youngblood, 488 U.S. at 58.
46
Kinsler & MacIver, supra note 10, at 774-75.
47
Kronisch, 150 F.3d at 126. See also West v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co.,
167 F.3d 776, 779 (2d Cir. 1999) (noting that while a district court has broad discretion
in choosing an appropriate sanction for spoliation, the applicable sanction is intended
to serve the prophylactic, punitive, and remedial rationales underlying the spoliation
doctrine).
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Pastorello v. City of New York,48 a recent New York case,
imposed a sanction designed to: (1) deter parties from engaging
in spoliation; (2) place the risk of an erroneous judgment on the
party who wrongfully created the risk; and (3) restore the
prejudiced party to the same position he would have been in
absent the wrongful destruction of evidence by the opposing
party.49
A.

Federal and State Remedies

The remedy available to the nonspoliating party also is
influenced by the forum where the spoliation occurs.50 For
example, state courts usually apply the substantive law of the
forum to spoliation claims.51 Federal courts, on the other hand,
have divergent views. Some hold that spoliation during
pending litigation is substantive and governed by state law,
while others consider spoliation a procedural matter under the
rules of federal procedure.52 Thus, similar facts may lead to
different results depending upon the law of the state, and
whether the action is brought in federal or state court.53 The
distinction is significant as it can mean the difference between
a case surviving and being dismissed.54
In theory, courts have broad discretion in imposing
sanctions for spoliation of evidence.55 In practice, they are faced
with procedural constraints.56 For example, Federal Rule 37
permits a court to sanction a party who spoliates evidence in

48
49

No. 95 Civ. 470(CSH), 2003 WL 1740606 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 1, 2003).
Id. at *7 (quoting West, 167 F.3d at 779 (quoting Kronisch, 150 F.3d at

126)).
50

KOESEL, BELL & TURNBULL, supra note 1, at 2.
Id.
52
Cecilia Hallinan, Balancing the Scales After Evidence is Spoiled: Does
Pennsylvania’s Approach Sufficiently Protect the Injured Party? 44 VILL. L. REV. 947,
951-52 (1999); Moyers v. Ford Motor Co., 941 F. Supp. 883, 884 (E.D. Mo. 1996)
(holding that federal law applies as sanctions are within court’s inherent powers);
Allstate Ins. Co. v. Sunbeam Corp., 865 F. Supp. 1267, 1278 (N.D. Ill. 1994) (noting
that the duty to preserve a defective product is a substantive issue to be decided by
state law), aff’d, 53 F.3d 804 (7th Cir. 1995).
53
KOESEL, BELL & TURNBULL, supra note 11 at 775.
54
Id. n.23 (citing Hank Grzlak, Federal, State Courts at Odds on Spoliation,
PENN. L. WKLY., July 22, 1996 at 1 (explaining that in Pennsylvania, “if a key piece of
evidence is missing in state court, the case has a good chance of being dismissed, even
if the allegedly defective part is preserved,” whereas “[i]n federal court, the judge will
impose some type of sanction, but the case is likely to survive”)).
55
Judge, supra note 18, at 446.
56
Dale A. Nance, Missing Evidence, 13 CARDOZO L. REV. 831, 865 (1991).
51
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response to discovery and evidentiary requests.57 However, Rule
37 usually will not apply to spoliation that occurs prior to
litigation because the rule only governs sanctions for violations
of a court order.58 Rule 37 is thus designed to enforce
compliance with discovery rules rather than to punish the
wrongdoer.59
To address pre-litigation spoliation, courts have relied
on their “inherent power” to control the judicial process and
litigation.60 The power is limited, however, to measures
necessary to redress conduct “which abuses the judicial
process.”61 Though commentators have noted that some judges
may be uncomfortable relying on inherent authority,62 the
inherent powers have proven effective in permitting courtordered sanctions.63 In addition, some federal laws, 64 and many
ethical rules, impose similar duties.65 Many state statutes
authorize criminal sanctions against a party who destroys
evidence.66 Regardless of their source of power, courts have
significant latitude in deciding which discovery sanctions are
appropriate under the circumstances.67
57

FED. R. CIV. P. 37(b)(2) (authorizing sanctions for violations of discovery
orders). Note that most states have a rule modeled after Rule 37. In New York, for
example, N.Y. C.P.L.R. 3126 (McKinney 2003) allows the court to impose penalties
when parties refuse to comply with discovery or disclosure orders.
58
Hutchings, supra note 24, at 400-01 (citing FED. R. CIV. P. 37).
59
See Robinson v. Transamerica Ins. Co., 368 F.2d 37, 39 (10th Cir. 1966)
(explaining that FED. R. CIV. 37(d) secures compliance with discovery rules, rather than
punishing parties); In re Marriage of Lai, 625 N.E.2d 330, 334 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993) (“The
purpose of discovery sanctions is to coerce recalcitrant parties to cooperate in
accomplishing the required discovery, not to punish.”).
60
United States v. Shaffer Equip. Co., 11 F.3d 450, 462 (4th Cir.1993)
(recognizing “that when a party deceives a court or abuses the process at a level that is
utterly inconsistent with the orderly administration of justice or undermines the
integrity of the process, the court has the inherent power to dismiss the action.”).
61
Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 45 (1991) (Kennedy, J., dissenting)
(recognizing the inherent power of the courts to fashion appropriate sanctions for
conduct that disrupts the judicial process).
62
Judge, supra note 18, at 447 (citing Chambers, 501 U.S. at 61).
63
Id.
64
See, e.g., Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 18 U.S.C. § 1519 (2002).
65
See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.4 (2003) (“A lawyer shall
not . . . unlawfully obstruct another party’s access to evidence or unlawfully alter,
destroy, or conceal a document or other material having potential evidentiary value.”).
66
See Cassandra G. Sasso & Mary Price Birk, Discovery and Spoliation
Issues in the High-Tech Age, COLO. LAW., Sept. 2003, at 81, 82. Moreover, because
spoliation in the majority of states is a mere misdemeanor, a spoliator will likely prefer
this minor criminal sanction as opposed to the risk of an enormous civil money
judgment. See Jay E. Rivlin, Recognizing an Independent Tort Action Will Spoil a
Spoliator’s Splendor, 26 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1003, 1017 (1998).
67
See Henderson v. Tyrrell, 910 P.2d 522, 531 (Wash. Ct. App. 1996) (“A trial
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Nonetheless, a court will not always sanction a
spoliating party.68 Rather, courts typically attempt to balance a
number of factors in determining whether sanctions for
prelitigation document destruction are appropriate.69 New York
courts, for example, simply ask whether a particular sanction
is prejudicial and fair.70 This may explain why New York acts
with relative impunity when applying the sanction of the
adverse inference instruction.71 California courts, on the other
hand, take a more precise approach in trying to arrive at an
appropriate sanction. They apply a balancing test that consists
of four factors: (1) the nature and seriousness of the harm to
the injured party; (2) the nature and significance of the
interests promoted by the actor’s conduct (was it unfair or
immoral?); (3) the character of the means used by the actor;
and (4) the actor’s motive (was the destruction of the records
primarily to prevent their use in litigation?).72 California’s
approach, then, offers a more tailored and, perhaps, more
exacting and efficient remedy than that of New York’s.73

court’s decision regarding sanctions for discovery violations . . . [is] discretionary, and
will not be disturbed on appeal absent a showing of abuse of discretion.”). See also
Insurance Corp. of Ireland v. Compagnie Des Bauxites De Guinee, 456 U.S. 694, 707
(1982); Gates Rubber Co. v. Bando Chem. Indus., Ltd., 167 F.R.D. 90, 102 (D. Colo.
1996).
68
See Kinsler & MacIver, supra note 10, at 766-67.
69
Id. See also Alliance to End Repression v. Rochford, 75 F.R.D. 438, 441
(N.D. Ill. 1976) (citing Black v. United States, 389 F.Supp. 529 (D.D.C. 1975)).
70
Fada Indust., Inc. v. Falchi Bldg. Co., 730 N.Y.S.2d 827, 828 (Sup. Ct.
2001) (“In deciding whether to impose sanctions for spoliation of evidence, courts will
look to the extent that the spoliation of evidence may prejudice a party, and whether a
particular sanction will be necessary as a matter of elementary fairness.”).
71
See discussions of adverse inference instruction infra Part II.B and New
York’s Approaches to Spoliation infra Part IV.
72
Willard v. Caterpillar, 48 Cal. Rptr. 2d 607, 621-26 (Cal. App. 1995). See
Kinsler & MacIver, supra note 10, at 766-67 (discussing how California courts balance
competing interests in deciding whether to impose sanctions for spoliation). Although
the elements establishing a basis for imposition of sanctions are not settled, the
prevailing consensus of courts is that sanctions are appropriate when a party (1)
destroys discoverable matter (2) under its control (3) which the party knew or should
have known (4) was relevant to pending, imminent or reasonably foreseeable litigation.
See JAMIE S. GORELICK ET AL., DESTRUCTION OF EVIDENCE § 3.8 (1989).
73
Other factors that courts employ include the culpability of the spoliating
party, the prejudice to the non-offending party, the degree of interference with the
judicial process, whether lesser sanctions will remedy any harm and deter future acts
of spoliation, whether evidence has been irretrievably lost, and whether sanctions will
unfairly punish a party for misconduct by the attorney. However, as one court
explained, “[t]hese factors do not constitute a rigid test; rather, they represent criteria
for the . . . court to consider prior to imposing . . . a sanction.” Ehrenhaus v. Reynolds
965 F.2d 916, 921 (10th Cir. 1992) (considering whether dismissal was proper based on
spoliation).
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Adverse Inference Instruction

The adverse inference jury instruction is the most
common and, arguably, most controversial, remedy for
spoliation.74 Under this remedy, the court instructs the jury to
presume that destroyed evidence, if produced, would have been
adverse to the party that destroyed it.75 As one court has noted,
“[i]t is a well-established and long-standing principle of law
that a party’s intentional destruction of evidence relevant to
proof of an issue at trial can support an inference that the
evidence would have been unfavorable to the party responsible
for its destruction.”76
For example, when a defendant destroys only records
relating to a particular transaction on which the plaintiff is
suing, there is a strong inference that those records would have
demonstrated the defendant’s liability.77 Similarly, the
destruction of documents in violation of a document retention
policy gives rise to an inference that such documents were
unfavorable to the party who destroyed them.78 In Latimore v.
Citibank Fed. Sav. Bank, for instance, the court found that
“[t]he violation of a record-retention regulation creates a
presumption that the missing record contained evidence
adverse to the violator.”79 The inference, as a result, has
remedial, punitive and deterrent objectives.80 The remedial
74

One of the earliest and most-cited decisions to recognize the adverse
inference instruction was Armory v. Delemirie, 93 Eng. Rep. 664 (K.B. 1722). In that
case, a young chimney sweep found a ring with a jewel and asked a jeweler to appraise
its value. The jeweler returned the ring to the boy but had removed the jewel, claiming
at trial that it had been misplaced. The court held that unless the jewel was produced,
the jury could presume it to be of the highest value possible for its size. The court, then,
assumed that the jeweler would have produced the jewel had it been less valuable. Id.
75
JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 291
(James H. Chadbourn rev. 1979).
76
Kronisch v. United States, 150 F.3d 112, 126 (2d Cir. 1998).
77
Nation-Wide Check Corp. v. Forest Hills Distrib., 692 F.2d 214, 217-18 (1st
Cir. 1982).
78
See Byrnie v. Town of Cromwell, Bd. of Educ., 243 F.3d 93, 109 (2d Cir.
2001) (citing Latimore v. Citibank Fed. Sav. Bank, 151 F.3d 712, 716 (7th Cir.1998))
("The violation of a record[-]retention regulation creates a presumption that the
missing record contained evidence adverse to the violator."); Favors v. Fisher, 13 F.3d
1235, 1239 (8th Cir. 1994) (because employer violated record retention regulation,
plaintiff “was entitled to the benefit of a presumption that the destroyed documents
would have bolstered her case.”); Hicks v. Gates Rubber Co., 833 F.2d 1406, 1419 (10th
Cir. 1987). See supra notes 34-39 and accompanying text for a discussion of document
retention policies relating to electronic evidence.
79
Latimore v. Citibank Fed. Sav. Bank, 151 F.3d 712, 716 (7th Cir. 1998).
80
JAMES WM MOORE, MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 37.121 (3d ed. 1997). See
also Pastorello v. City of New York, No. 95 Civ. 470(CSH), 2003 WL 1740606 at *8
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effect is designed to restore the prejudiced party to its previous
position, as if the spoliation had not occurred.81 The punitive
and deterrent effect is supposed to discourage and punish
spoliation by placing the risk of an erroneous judgment on the
party who wrongfully created such a risk.82 This often creates
an unavoidable incentive for the spoliating party to settle
where such party might otherwise have gone to trial.
Regardless of these objectives, the instruction still allows a
spoliating party to survive a motion for summary judgment or
a motion to dismiss. The spoliation inference does, however,
have its limitations.
Most jurisdictions do not allow an adverse inference to
substitute for an essential element of a plaintiff’s or
defendant’s case.83 Therefore, a plaintiff suffering from
spoliation cannot build his case on the spoliation inference
alone. For the underlying claim to be actionable, the plaintiff
must also possess some concrete evidence that will support the
claim.84 Furthermore, the doctrine of adverse inferences cannot
be applied to cases with third-party spoliators.85 Thus, the court
will give the instruction only when the spoliator is a party to
the lawsuit.86
Although courts generally agree that an adverse
inference instruction is appropriate when the spoliating party
has violated a duty to preserve evidence, courts disagree on the

(S.D.N.Y. Apr. 1, 2003) (“An adverse inference charge as a spoliation sanction has two
underlying rationales, the first being remedial, to restore the prejudiced party to its
previous evidentiary position; and the second being punitive, to act as a deterrent.”);
Shaffer,169 F.R.D. at 25 (“An adverse inference charge serves the dual purposes of
remediation and punishment.”).
81
See generally Kronisch, 150 F.3d at 126 (stating that an adverse inference
instruction serves the remedial purpose, “insofar as possible, of restoring the
prejudiced party to the same position he would have been in absent the wrongful
destruction of evidence by the opposing party.”).
82
Turner v. Hudson Transit Lines, Inc., 142 F.R.D. 68, 75 (S.D.N.Y. 1991)
(“The adverse inference thus acts as a deterrent against even the negligent destruction
of evidence.”).
83
Kammerer v. Sewerage and Water Bd. of New Orleans, 633 So.2d 1357,
1361 (La. Ct. App. 1994) (“The traditional rule at common law will not substitute the
adverse inference for plaintiff’s proof of an essential element of his or her case . . . .”)
(Walter, J., concurring).
84
Id.
85
Stefan Rubin, Tort Reform: A Call for Florida to Scale Back its
Independent Tort for the Spoliation of Evidence, 51 FLA. L. REV. 345, 365 (1999)
(stating that, when the spoliator is a third party, “an adverse inference against the
spoliator would serve no purpose.”).
86
See discussion of Tort for Third-Party Spoliation infra Part III.C.
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requisite level of culpability.87 Some courts require the showing
of “bad faith” or intentional destruction before giving a
spoliation inference instruction.88 Generally, few courts have
ruled that negligence is enough to support the giving of the
instruction.89 Still other courts have yet to decide on a defined
state of mind.90 Evidence, then, can be spoliated along a full
range of culpability—it can be destroyed innocently,
negligently, recklessly, intentionally, or in bad faith.91
However, as one commentator has noted, as the
culpability of the spoliating party decreases (from intent to
innocence), so too does the appeal of the punitive and deterrent
purpose underlying the inference.92 For example, where a party
intentionally destroys evidence, such conduct gives rise to a
strong inference that the party itself thought the evidence
would be so harmful to its case that it was worth the risk of
getting caught to destroy it.93 This intentional conduct should
be punished in addition to placing the injured party in the
same position it would have been absent the loss of evidence.
Such punishment usually comes in the form of high damages
87

See Drew D. Dropkin, Linking the Culpability and Circumstantial
Evidence Requirements for the Spoliation Inference, 51 DUKE L.J. 1803, 1805 (2002).
88
Aramburu v. Boeing Co., 112 F.3d 1398, 1407 (10th Cir. 1997); see also
Vodusek v. Bayliner Marine Corp., 71 F.3d 148, 156 (4th Cir. 1995) (plaintiff must
show willful conduct resulted in the loss or destruction of evidence).
89
See, e.g., Residential Funding Corp. v. DeGeorge Fin. Corp., 306 F.3d 99
(2d Cir. 2002). See also Nation-Wide Check Corp. v. Forest Hills Distribs., Inc., 692
F.2d 214, 219 (1st Cir. 1982) (bad faith not necessary to establish inference); Turner v.
Hudson Transit Lines, Inc., 142 F.R.D. 68, 75 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (in granting an adverse
inference instruction based on the defendant’s negligent destruction of evidence, the
court stated, “It makes little difference to the party victimized by the destruction of
evidence whether that act was done willfully or negligently. . . . [T]he risk that the
evidence would have been detrimental rather than favorable should fall on the party
responsible for its loss”).
90
Hirsch v. Gen. Motors Corp., 628 A.2d 1108, 1117 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1993)
(noting that courts disagree whether bad faith or negligence is required). Second
Circuit cases also offer different and shifting standards. See Byrnie v. Town of
Cromwell, Bd. of Educ., 243 F.3d 93, 107-08 (2d Cir. 2001) (noting that the law in the
Second Circuit is unclear on what state of mind a party must have when destroying
evidence). Compare Fujitsu Ltd. v. Federal Exp. Corp. 247 F.3d 423, 436 (2d Cir. 2001)
(requiring intentional destruction) with Reilly v. Natwest Markets Group, Inc., 181
F.3d 253, 267 (2d Cir. 1999) (bad faith is not a “per se” rule, and gross negligence may
suffice).
91
It is difficult to establish a uniform principle because of the ongoing debate
about the proper role of inferences, rebuttable presumptions, and shifting burdens of
production and persuasion. Some courts use these phrases interchangeably while other
courts distinguish them.
92
KOESEL, BELL & TURNBULL, supra note 1, at 36-37 (quoting Nation-Wide
Check Corp., 692 F.2d at 218).
93
See Nesson, supra note 5, at 796.
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awarded by the jury.94 Where the spoliation is merely negligent,
however, a wrongdoer is arguably less culpable and should not
be punished for acts that had no ulterior motive or purpose.
Nevertheless, a jury could impose damages that had a punitive
effect on even a negligent spoliator.95 The argument that a
stronger inference would be appropriate where the spoliation is
intentional is a valid one.96 For this reason, many courts require
corroborating evidence of spoliation before imposing an adverse
inference on negligent spoliators.97 As for those courts which do
impose the inference on negligent spoliators, many impose a
rebuttable presumption, allowing the spoliator to rebut the
testimony of the spoliation victim.98 Thus, by permitting the
defendant to give a reasonable explanation for the destruction

94

Although no systematic studies exist showing that the adverse inference
instruction induces a jury to award high damages, commentators and lawyers have
noted the instruction’s strong influence on jury decisions. For example, a jury returned
a $55.8 million verdict for four plaintiffs who were struck by a train after hearing
evidence that the train company had destroyed important tapes between the conductor
of the train and a dispatcher. The plaintiffs’ lawyer noted that the adverse inference
instruction conveyed to the jury the alleged institutionalization of spoliation in the
upper echelons of rail companies and was key to cultivating large damage awards. See
Nick Upmeyer, Verdicts Involving Railroads Produce Millions – And Lessons on
Evidence, NAT’L L.J., Feb. 3, 2003, at C20. (citing Barber v. Union Pacific, No. CIV-98312 (Ark. Cir. Ct. 2002)). Another train accident case drew a $6 million verdict after
the jury received an adverse inference instruction. According to the plaintiff’s lawyer,
the jury was “disappointed that the railroad not only destroyed the documents but then
came in and tried to explain it away.” See Howard Pankratz, Injured Rail Worker
Awarded $6 Million, DENVER POST, Sept. 22, 2002, at B4.
95
Stipancich, supra note 21, at 1151 (recognizing that damages are not only
speculative, but can be extremely disproportionate to culpability of negligent party).
96
See also Judge, supra note 18, at 445 (commenting that the adverse
inference is predominantly applied to intentional destruction of evidence) (citing Beers
v. Bayliner Marine Corp., 675 A.2d 829, 832 (Conn. 1996)) (noting that courts generally
require a showing that spoliation was intentional before drawing an adverse inference
against the party who has destroyed evidence).
97
Turner v. Hudson Transit Lines, Inc., 142 F.R.D. 68, 77 (S.D.N.Y. 1991)
(noting that the “corroboration requirement is even more necessary where the
destruction was merely negligent, since in those cases it cannot be inferred from the
conduct of the spoliator that the evidence would even have been harmful to him.”).
Residential Funding Corp. v. Degeorge Financial Corp. 306 F.3d 99, 108 (2d Cir. 2002)
(“The sanction of an adverse inference may be appropriate in some cases involving the
negligent destruction of evidence because each party should bear the risk of its own
negligence.”).
98
See generally Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC, 220 F.R.D. 212, 221
(S.D.N.Y. 2003) (noting that, in cases where bad faith is not clear, courts tend to favor
a rebuttable presumption that the destroyed evidence was unfavorable to the party
responsible for its absence). See also Boyd v. Travelers Ins. Co., 652 N.E.2d 267, 271
(Ill. 1995) (stating that in a negligence action for the spoliation of evidence, a “plaintiff
must demonstrate . . . that but for the defendant’s loss or destruction of evidence, the
plaintiff had a reasonable probability of succeeding in the underlying suit.”).
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of the evidence, the burden-shifting presumption is considered
less severe for negligent spoliators.99
The determination of whether to apply an adverse
inference instruction to the facts of a case is ultimately left to
the jury.100 For example, the jurors hear evidence by both
parties relating to the factual question of whether the evidence
was destroyed while in the control of the party against whom
the inference would be drawn.101 If the jury determines the
evidence does not amount to spoliation, then they will be
instructed by the court not to employ the adverse inference
instruction.102 If the jurors decide spoliation has occurred, they
will factor the adverse inference into their deliberations.103 In
either instance, the jury is allowed to hear not only evidence of
the underlying claim, but evidence of the purported spoliation
as well. Potentially, then, the evidence of spoliation informs
and influences a jury’s decision as much, if not more so, than
the underlying facts of the claim itself.104
This risk of unduly prejudicing the position of the
spoliator is a valid reason for not using the adverse inference
instruction.105 For example, the inference has the potential to
focus the jury’s attention on the spoliation itself, which is a
collateral issue, and thereby distract the jury from the actual
merits of the case. To prevent such prejudice, under Rule 403 of
99

In some instances, application of the rebuttable presumption is based on
whether spoliation was committed by plaintiff or defendant, and not necessarily on the
state of mind of the party who committed the act. Thus, destruction of evidence by the
plaintiff often results in a jury instruction to draw an adverse inference while
destruction by a defendant usually results in a jury instruction to view the inference as
a rebuttable presumption. See Anthony J. Sebok, Spoliation in Modern Tort Litigation
4 (Nov. 12, 2003) (unpublished manuscript prepared for symposium on “Ethical Issues
in Mass Torts and Product Liability Litigation,” on file with author) (citing Vodusek v.
Bayliner Corp., 71 F.3d 148 (4th Cir. 1995) (citing Rule 37)); Pastorello v. City of New
York, No. 95 Civ. 470(CSH), 2003 WL 1740606 at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 1, 2003) (citing
Rule 37); Hulett v. Niagara Mohawk Power Corp., No. 92-7110, 2002 WL 31010983
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. Aug. 1, 2002).
100
See GORELICK, supra note 72, § 2.2. Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
37 and analogous state rules, a court can instruct a jury to draw an adverse inference
from the absence of material evidence. See supra text accompanying notes 59-61
(discussing power of court to sanction parties in violation of discovery orders under
Federal Rule 37).
101
See GORELICK, supra note 72, § 3.11.
102
Even if a judge or magistrate determines that spoliation has occurred and
orders an adverse inference instruction, the jury is nonetheless entitled to disregard it
in making its decision. See id.
103
See id.
104
See Imwinkelried, supra note 3, at 804.
105
DAVID W. LOUISELL & CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER, FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 70
(rev. ed. 1985).
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the Federal Rules of Evidence, a judge may exclude evidence of
spoliation if he determines it would pose a substantial danger
of “confusi[ng] . . . the issues . . . or misleading the jury.”106
Nonetheless, in situations where evidence is not excluded, a
jury might still be tempted to return a verdict adverse to the
spoliating party as a means of punishing the party for the
misdeed, even if the jurors were not convinced of the spoliator’s
liability.107 Thus, the probative value of using the inference
might well be outweighed by the probative danger of unfairly
penalizing the spoliator.
Rule 403 may be an effective tool for a party resisting
the use of the inference when the evidence will distract the jury
from the merits of the case.108 The argument is convincing. For
example, the question is not whether a defendant discarded
train maintenance records, but whether a defendant was
responsible for causing a train wreck that severely injured the
plaintiff.109 However, trial judges do not simply exclude evidence
relating to an event other than the central historical event on
the merits of the case under Rule 403. On the contrary, in
product liability actions, plaintiffs frequently introduce
evidence of other accidents involving the same or a similarly
designed product.110 Evidence of other accidents involving other
victims is admissible to establish the existence of the defect in
the product’s design.111 Thus, though judges exercise discretion
to exclude evidence of spoliation that is collateral to the main
action, they may still employ the adverse inference instruction
106

FED. R. EVID. 403. Under the legal relevance doctrine, codified in the
Federal Rules of Evidence, a judge may exclude otherwise admissible, relevant
evidence when she fears that the introduction of the evidence would generate “unfair
prejudice” against the litigant.
107
Lawrence Solum & Stephen J. Marzen, Truth and Uncertainty: Legal
Control of the Destruction of Evidence, 36 EMORY L.J. 1085, 1161 (1987).
108
Imwinkelried, supra note 3, at 804.
109
In case where jury returned verdict of $30.1 million against railroad
company for destroying tapes, plaintiff’s attorney noted that, “[The] fact [that the
railroad company destroyed tapes] alone helped convince the jury that the rail
company had something to hide.” See Upmeyer, supra note 94, at C20.
110
Mary A. Parker & Susan Garner, Special Evidentiary Issues in Products
Cases, TRIAL, Nov. 1991, at 41 (“[U]nder the case law and the Federal Rules of
Evidence, evidence of similar accidents is normally admitted.”); see also Francis H.
Hare, Jr. & Mitchell K. Shelly, The Admissibility of Other Similar Incident Evidence: A
Three-Step Approach, 15 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 541, 545-46 (Spring 1992) (“Courts have
consistently held that evidence of other similar incidents is relevant to show either the
existence of a defect or the relative danger of a condition or service.”).
111
Imwinkelried, supra note 3, at 804 (noting that “from a jury’s point of view,
there may be no more important evidence on the issue of the product’s defective
condition than the performance and experience of that product in the real world.”).

2/16/2005 2:38:18 PM

1062

BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 70:3

when the destroyed evidence has significant probative worth on
the historical merits of the case.112
Proponents of the adverse inference emphasize that it
avoids the costs of collateral litigation (such as an independent
tort action based on intentional or negligent spoliation).113 Also,
unlike the extreme remedies of dismissal or default judgment,
the spoliation inference may be the most appropriate and
proportional judicial response and may do the best job of fairly
compensating the victimized party.114
Critics of the spoliation inference generally fall into two
camps. The first camp claims that the inference fails to achieve
the objectives of punishment and deterrence. In this regard,
the inference is insufficient as a punitive remedy because, even
in its strongest application, it merely levels the playing field.115
Furthermore, the inference may even encourage a plaintiff
with a weak case to simply lose or destroy the product, endure
the spoliation inference, and take his or her chances with the
jury.116 Lastly, critics argue that the inference may be impotent
as a deterrent because the jury has the discretion to dismiss
the court’s instruction outright.117 Followers of this view, then,
often see the inference as the least onerous sanction available
to rectify spoliation.
The second camp sees the inference as having the
potential to be one of the most severe responses to spoliation.
For example, such commentators fear that juries will be unduly
influenced by destruction of evidence and will unfairly penalize
litigants by means of the adverse inference instruction.118 These
commentators also question the capacity of instructions on the
scope of the inquiry to control the jury, particularly in cases in

112
113
114

Id.
See KOESEL, BELL & TURNBULL, supra note 1, at 40.
Anderson v. Beatrice Foods Co., 900 F.2d 388, 395 (1st Cir. 1990) (citations

omitted).
115

Id.
See generally David H. Canter, The Missing or Altered Product: Nightmare
or Dream? 26 SW. U. L. REV. 1051, 1061 (1997) (noting that after destroying evidence,
plaintiffs can retain experts “who are able to forcefully argue their position without
fear that defendant will have physical evidence to disprove theories.” (citing Bass v.
General Motors, 929 F.Supp. 1287, 1289 (W.D. Mo. 1996)).
117
KOESEL, BELL & TURNBULL, supra note 1, at 174 (citing Blinzler v. Marriot
Int’l, Inc., 81 F.3d 1148 (1st Cir. 1996)).
118
Solum, supra note 107, at 1093 (citing John MacArthur Maguire & Robert
C. Vincent, Admissions Implied from Spoliation or Related Conduct, 45 YALE L.J. 226,
231 (1935)).
116
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which the conduct of the spoliator was outrageous.119 For these
critics, the inference would be more appropriate if used in a
criminal, as opposed to civil, context.120
C.

Discovery and Evidentiary Sanctions

The discovery sanction is more precise, more diverse,
and more tailored to the facts of the case than an adverse
inference instruction.121 For example, courts can sanction
spoliators by excluding evidence which is probative of the same
issue or issues as the destroyed evidence, aiming to balance the
parties’ conflicting interests. This sanction applies by excluding
direct testimony relating to the spoliated evidence and any
reports or secondary evidence, such as photos of the scene,
taken by the expert.122 Excluding plaintiff’s expert testimony is
a less severe sanction than dismissal, yet the practical result is
often the same. If a plaintiff cannot introduce expert testimony
relating to the defective condition of a product, the court may
grant summary judgment to the defendant because there is not
enough evidence to proceed.123 The plaintiff may, however, have
other relevant evidence or may attempt to prove an alternative
theory for the cause of the accident.124
The sanction of dismissing the entire action or entering
a default judgment is among the most severe sanctions within
the court’s power for spoliation.125 Because this sanction is so
119

Id. (citing Maguire & Vincent, supra note 118, at 246).
Such critics note that in criminal cases the courts frequently admit
testimony about an accused’s pretrial misconduct on the theory that the misconduct
evidences the accused’s consciousness of guilt. For instance, if the accused destroys or
conceals incriminating physical evidence, the prosecution may use this to help prove
the accused’s culpability. By doing so, the prosecutor invites the jury to infer the
accused’s guilt from the accused’s conduct. In effect, by acting in this manner, the
accused “admits” his guilt. See Imwinkelried, supra note 3, at 796-97.
121
See Judge, supra note 18, at 445-46.
122
See, e.g., N. Assurance Co. v. Ware, 145 F.R.D. 281, 282 (D. Me. 1993)
(finding that while dismissal would be too severe, exclusion of the evidence was
appropriate despite the lack of any showing that plaintiff acted deliberately); Headley
v. Chrysler Motor Corp., 141 F.R.D. 362, 365-66 (D. Mass. 1991) (excluding plaintiff’s
expert evidence due to the prejudice to defendant and the advantage plaintiff would
obtain otherwise); Hoffman v. Ford Motor Co., 587 N.W.2d 66, 72 (Minn. Ct. App. 1998)
(excluding the testimony of the plaintiff’s expert regarding the cause of the fire in
plaintiff’s garage after the evidence was destroyed).
123
See, e.g., Headley v. Chrysler Motor Corp., 141 F.R.D. 362, 366 n.18 (D.
Mass. 1991); Unigard Sec. Ins. Co. v. Lakewood Eng’g & Mfg. Corp., 982 F.2d 363, 369
(9th Cir. 1992).
124
See Unigard, 982 F.2d at 370.
125
See generally Miller v. Time-Warner Communications, Inc., 1999 WL
739528 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 22, 1999) (holding that dismissal is appropriate if there is a
120
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extreme, it is reserved for only the most egregious offenses, and
may not be imposed if there is a lesser, but equally efficient,
remedy available.126 However, some courts have not hesitated to
impose this penalty against both plaintiff and defendant
spoliators who were merely negligent.127
In New York, for example, the negligent disposal of
evidence before an adversary has had an opportunity to inspect
it will suffice to enter a dismissal of the case.128 These sanctions
may be imposed against parties to a lawsuit who violate the
appropriate rules of discovery, or may even be imposed through
the “inherent power” of the court itself.129
D.

Criminal Penalties

In addition to discovery and evidentiary sanctions,
many jurisdictions have obstruction of justice statutes that
impose criminal liability on spoliators of evidence.130 However,
some courts have noted that obstruction of justice statutes do
not provide sufficient deterrence because many violations are
only misdemeanors.131 Moreover, it appears that prosecutors are
unlikely to pursue obstruction of justice claims against
spoliators in civil proceedings.132 Nonetheless, many federal
showing of willfulness, bad faith or fault on the part of the sanctioned party).
126
See generally Bachmeier v. Wallwork Truck Centers, 507 N.W.2d 527 (N.D.
1993) (reversing dismissal and remanding for further proceedings for the consideration
of less restrictive sanctions for negligent spoliation).
127
Where plaintiff has negligently or intentionally destroyed relevant
evidence, both federal and New York state courts will dismiss plaintiff’s suit. See
Sebok, supra note 99, at 4 (citing Pucia v. Farley, 261 A.D.2d 83, 85 (N.Y. App. Div.
1999)). Where defendant is the spoliator, however, federal courts are less willing to
grant summary judgement for plaintiff, though New York courts have done this in
some instances. Id. (citing DiDomenico v. C & S Aeromatik Supplies, Inc., 252 A.D.2d
41, 53 (App. Div., 1998)). But see Jones v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 137 F.R.D. 657
(C.D. Ill. 1991) (federal court granting plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment).
128
Cummings v. Central Tractor Farm & Country Inc., 722 N.Y.S.2d 285
(App. Div. 2001) (holding that party need not act intentionally, contumaciously, or in
bad faith in connection with loss or destruction of evidence to impose ultimate sanction
of directing judgment against it or dismissing suit).
129
See Wilhoit, supra note 37, at 649 (citing Bachmeier, 507 N.W.2d at 533).
130
Id. at 650 (citing ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 13-2809 (2001); CAL. PENAL CODE §
135 (1999); and MINN. STAT. § 609.63(7)(2003)).
131
See Smith v. Superior Court, 198 Cal. Rptr. 829, 835 (Ct. App. 1984) (“If
crucial evidence could be intentionally destroyed by a party to a civil action who
thereby stands to gain substantially monetarily by such destruction, the effect of a
misdemeanor would be of minimal deterrence.”), overruled by Cedars-Sinai Med. Ctr. v.
Superior Court, 954 P.2d 511, 521 n.4 (Cal. 1998). For a discussion of Smith, see infra
text and accompanying notes 140-145.
132
See Sean R. Levine, Spoliation of Evidence in West Virginia: Do Too Many
Torts Spoliate the Broth? 104 W. VA. L. REV. 419, 432-33 (2002) (citing Smith, 198 Cal.
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obstruction of justice statutes have recently been amended
under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002133 which arguably makes
the imposition of criminal sanctions a more viable option for
prosecutors and courts alike.
III.

THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE SPOLIATION TORT

Courts in general have been cautious in recognizing or
applying any independent tort of spoliation. In fact, only a few
courts have developed a policy toward holding spoliators of
evidence liable in tort.134 Similar to judicial remedies, spoliation
as a tort furthers the goals of deterrence, punishment and
remediation. However, unlike such remedies, the separate tort
allows recovery of punitive damages in addition to the
originally contemplated damages.135 As a result, advocates of
the tort argue that a spoliator may be even more disinclined to
destroy incriminating evidence considering he has much to
lose.136 States adopting the tort have noted that traditional
remedies are inadequate as they do not fully compensate the
spoliation victim.137 Furthermore, the tort is the only remedy
that allows a plaintiff to recover directly from third-party
spoliators.138 Ultimately, an independent tort of spoliation
Rptr. at 835) (“We know of no prosecution under California Penal Code section 135 –
adopted in 1872 . . . for destroying or concealing documentary evidence relevant only to
prospective civil action.”). See also United States v. Lundwall, 1 F. Supp. 2d 249
(S.D.N.Y. 1998) (finding that civil discovery remedies might be insufficient at times,
and that the federal obstruction of justice statute was applicable, regardless of the fact
that it had never previously been used in a civil destruction of evidence context).
133
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act, largely a response to the Arthur Andersen
accounting scandal, imposes steep fines and up to twenty-year prison terms for anyone
found guilty of destroying corporate audit records or altering, destroying, or falsifying
documents to impede a contemplated or pending federal investigation, bankruptcy, or
official proceeding. 18 U.S.C. § 1512, 1519, and 1520. For a brief explanation of the
Andersen accounting scandal, see Chase, supra note 7, at 745-63.
134
See Smith v. Howard Johnson Co., 615 N.E.2d 1037, 1038 (Ohio 1993)
(adopting the tort of willful spoliation and listing its elements). See also Nolte, supra
note 25, at 359.
135
See Nolte, supra note 25, at 402.
136
In fact, damages in a spoliation action can amount to several millions of
dollars. See Wilhoit, supra note 37, at 633-34 (citing Margaret Cronin Fisk, Looking for
a New Cause of Action? NAT’L L.J., May 19, 1997, at A11 (describing one spoliation case
in which the jury awarded the plaintiff $9,000,000 and another case in which spoliation
was a key factor in a $12,000,000 settlement)).
137
Rivlin, supra note 66, at 1005 (noting that court’s remedial power is
severely limited when spoliation is discovered after entry of final judgment); see also
Stipancich, supra note 21, at 1139 (discussing traditional remedies’ inadequacy in
compensating aggrieved party and deterring spoliator).
138
See supra note 15 and accompanying text. See also discussion of tort of
third-party spoliation infra Part III.B.
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allows the injured party to bring an action against the spoliator
for damages caused solely by evidence destruction.139
A.

Tort of Intentional Spoliation

Smith v. Superior Court, a 1984 California case, is the
landmark decision recognizing a tort action for the intentional
spoliation of evidence.140 Smith was severely injured when the
wheel of an oncoming van broke loose and crashed through her
windshield.141 The van was brought to Abbott Ford, the garage
which had originally put the wheels on the van in the accident.
Abbott Ford, however, failed to retain the parts of the wheel
involved in the accident after promising to do so.142 Smith
alleged that her expert needed the lost parts to determine the
cause of the accident.143 The California Court of Appeals found
that Smith had stated a valid claim against Abbott Ford and,
thus, created a new tort.144 The court acknowledged that the
most troubling aspect of allowing an intentional spoliation
cause of action was the speculative nature of determining
damages, yet concluded that the societal interest in deterrence
outweighed the damages concern.145 Only a few jurisdictions
have followed Smith’s lead and adopted the separate tort of
intentional spoliation.146 Although each jurisdiction employs a
139

Levine, supra note 132, at 428 (citing Coletti v. Cudd Pressure Control, 165
F.3d 767 (10th Cir. 1999); Temple Cmty. Hospital v. Superior Court, 976 P.2d 223 (Cal.
1999); and Trevino v. Ortega, 969 S.W.2d 950 (Tex. 1998) as examples where the
spoliation inference was used as the basis for denial of the recognition of a spoliation
tort). See discussion of reasons for rejecting spoliation tort infra Part III.D.
140
Smith v. Superior Court, 198 Cal. Rptr. 829 (Ct. App. 1984).
141
Id. at 831.
142
Id.
143
Id.
144
Id. at 832 (quoting William Prosser, noting that “[n]ew and nameless torts
are being recognized constantly,” and “[t]he common threat woven in all torts is the
idea of an unreasonable interference with the interests of others”).
145
Smith, 198 Cal. Rptr. at 835-36 (the court analogized the emerging tort to
the recognized tort of intentional interference with prospective business advantage on
the basis that the opportunity to win a lawsuit is the same type of “valuable probable
expectancy” as the opportunity to obtain a contract).
146
Courts in Alaska, Florida, Kansas, New Jersey, New Mexico, Montana and
Ohio have recognized the tort of intentional spoliation. See Hazen v. Municipality of
Anchorage, 718 P.2d 456, 463 (Ak. 1986); St. Mary’s Hosp., Inc. v. Brinson, 685 So. 2d
33, 35 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996); Foster v. Lawrence Memorial Hosp., 809 F.Supp. 831,
836 (D. Kan. 1992); Oliver v. Stinson Lumber Co., 993 P.2d 11, 11 (Mont. 1999);
Viviano v. CBS Inc., 597 A.2d 543, 550 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1991); Coleman v.
Eddy Potash, Inc., 905 P.2d 185, 185 (N.M. 1995); and Smith v. Howard Johnson Co.,
615 N.E.2d 1037, 1037 (Ohio 1993). See also Margaret A. Egan, Tort Law – Spoliators
Beware, But Fear Not an Independent Suit, 24 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 233, 250
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slightly different formulation, the general elements of the
intentional spoliation tort include: (1) the existence of a
potential civil action; (2) defendant’s knowledge of the potential
action; (3) destruction of evidence; (4) intent; (5) causal
inability to prove the lawsuit or proximate cause; and (6)
damages.147
B.

Tort of Negligent Spoliation

Five months after Smith, the Third District Court of
Appeal in Florida recognized a separate cause of action for the
negligent spoliation of evidence in Bondu v. Gurvich.148 Bondu
noted that a claim for negligent spoliation of evidence may only
stand if the spoliator owed a duty to the plaintiff to preserve
evidence.149 Thus, negligent spoliation is characterized by a lack
of intent and an explicit recognition to preserve evidence for
another party’s use.150 A few states have followed Florida and
recognized negligent spoliation of evidence as a cause of
action.151
The recognition of intentional and negligent spoliation
as a separate tort did not create the following that proponents
of the tort had hoped for. In fact, the California Supreme Court
overruled Smith fourteen years later in Cedars-Sinai Med. Ctr.

(2001) (noting that, similar to Smith v. Superior Court, courts recognizing the separate
tort of spoliation have likened the harm arising from the destruction of evidence to that
suffered by plaintiffs in cases involving intentional interference with prospective
economic advantage).
147
See Levine, supra note 132, at 422.
148
473 So. 2d 1307 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984), cert. denied, 484 So. 2d 7 (Fla.
1986). Bondu involved a hospital that lost the plaintiff’s anesthesia records and was
subsequently unable to provide them to the plaintiff on his request. Id. at 1312.
149
The defendant hospital in fact had such a duty to save Bondu’s medical
records. Id. at 1313.
150
See Judge, supra note 18, at 449 (citing Continental Insurance Co. v.
Herman 576 So. 2d 313, 315 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1990)) (suggesting the following
elements for the negligent spoliation of evidence tort: (1) the existence of a potential
civil action; (2) a legal or contractual duty to preserve evidence which is relevant to the
potential civil action; (3) destruction of that evidence; (4) significant impairment in the
ability to prove the lawsuit; (5) a causal relationship between the evidence destruction
and the inability to prove the lawsuit; and (6) damages).
151
Florida, Illinois, New Jersey, Kansas and the District of Columbia have
recognized a cause of action for spoliation to include negligence as a basis of liability.
See Digiulio v. Prudential Prop & Cas. Ins. Co. 710 So. 2d 3, 5 (Fla. Ct. App. 1998);
Boyd v. Travelers Ins. Co., 652 N.E.2d 267, 271 (Ill. 1995); Holmes v. Amerex Rent-ACar, 180 F.3d 294, 295 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (holding that negligent or reckless spoliation of
evidence is an independent and actionable tort). See Foster, 809 F. Supp. at 836
(recognizing cause of action for intentional and negligent spoliation of evidence).
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v. Superior Court,152 holding that a party may not bring a
separate cause of action for intentional spoliation of evidence.
The court weighed several factors such as: (1) the availability of
other remedies; (2) the inherently difficult task of calculating
damages; and (3) the prospect of meritless spoliation actions.153
The court also noted that a separate tort imposes indirect costs
in preservation of otherwise valueless evidence.154 Although the
California Court of Appeals still recognizes claims for negligent
spoliation,155 the Cedars-Sinai decision cast a pall over this
cause of action as well.156
Despite courts’ increasingly harsh approaches to
spoliation over the last several years, the recent trend among
jurisdictions has been to reject the tort as it relates to first
parties.157 Rather than recognize a new tort, courts have decided
to employ court-enforced sanctions against the spoliator in the
underlying litigation.158 Courts have noted the costs to
defendants as well as the speculative nature of spoliated
evidence as additional reasons for not recognizing the tort.159
152

954 P.2d 511 (Cal. 1998).
Id. at 515. The court thoroughly examined these three areas: (1) holding
that a remedy for litigation-related misconduct should not create a “spiral of lawsuits”
and should recognize the need for finality in adjudication; (2) holding that the non-tort
remedies of evidentiary inference, discovery sanctions, disciplinary sanctions for
attorneys involved, and criminal penalties seem sufficient; and (3) distinguishing an
“uncertainty of the fact of harm” from mere uncertainty of amount of damages. The
issue of harm to damages was too speculative for a tort remedy to solve. Id. at 515-16.
154
Id. at 519.
155
See, e.g., Hernandez v. Garcetti, 80 Cal. Rptr. 2d 443, 448 (Cal. Ct. App.
1998); Johnson v. United Serv. Auto. Ass’n, 79 Cal. Rptr. 2d 234, 239 (Cal. Ct. App.
1998).
156
Some commentators see room for negligent spoliation claims, cautioning
that the California Supreme Court would likely require the “legal duty” it mentioned at
the start of its analysis. See Jerrold Abeles & Robert J. Tyson, Spoil Sport, L.A. LAW.,
Nov. 1999, at 41.
157
In fact, less than one month after Cedars-Sinai, the Texas Supreme Court
declined to recognize an independent cause of action for either intentional or negligent
spoliation. See Trevino v. Ortega, 969 S.W.2d 950, 951 (Tex. 1998). Levine, supra note
132, at 421-22 (citing KOESEL, BELL & TURNBULL, supra note 1, at 64-66).
158
See generally Fletcher v. Dorchester Mut. Ins. Co., 773 N.E.2d 420 (Mass.
2002) (noting there is no cause of action for spoliation of evidence when appropriately
tailored sanctions imposed in the underlying action are a more efficacious remedy for
spoliation than allowing a separate, inherently speculative cause of action for such
litigation misconduct).
159
Dowdle Butane Gas Co., v. Moore, 831 So. 2d 1124, 1135 (Miss. 2002)
(Supreme Court refused to recognize intentional spoliation of evidence against
spoliators as independent cause of action, where there were sufficient other avenues
and where costs to defendants and courts would have been enormous, particularly from
risks of erroneous determinations of liability due to uncertainty of harm. The court also
noted risk of excessive costs from extraordinary measures required to preserve, for
indefinite periods, items for purposes of avoiding potential spoliation liability in future
153
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Nonetheless, at least three courts have recognized the
spoliation tort for claims against third-parties since 1998.160
C.

Tort of Third-Party Spoliation

The recent recognition of the tort of third-party
spoliation may, indeed, be because it is the only remedy
available against such spoliators. For example, because third
parties are not part of the underlying, original lawsuit,
inferences and sanctions cannot be used against them.161
Therefore, without a third-party spoliation tort, “there may be
no civil remedy to compensate a litigant who is victimized by a
nonparty spoliator.”162 For this reason, even some of the tort’s
harshest critics support its use as protection against thirdparty spoliation.163 Indeed, several jurisdictions recognize a tort
for the negligent and/or intentional spoliation of evidence by
third parties because of the perceived failure of traditional
remedies in the third-party context.164
D.

Challenges to Recognition of the Tort of Spoliation

Recognizing the tort of spoliation, whether for first
parties or third parties, causes three significant problems.
First, it imposes a duty on the owner or custodian of the
litigation. Any benefits obtained by recognizing spoliation tort, noted the court, were
outweighed by burdens imposed.).
160
See, e.g., Smith v. Atkinson, 771 So. 2d 429, 432 (Ala. 2000); Oliver v.
Stimson Lumber Co., 993 P.2d 11, 18 (Mont. 1999); Holmes v. Amerex Rent-A-Car, 180
F.3d 294, 295 (D.C. Cir. 1999).
161
See Levine, supra note 132, at 438 n.128 (citing Elias v. Lancaster Gen
Hosp., 710 A.2d 65, 67-68 (Pa. Super. 1998)) (stating that “traditional remedies would
be unavailing, since the spoliator is not a party to the underlying litigation.”). See also
Levine, supra note 132, at 441.
162
See Judge, supra note 18, at 459.
163
For example, one year after Cedars-Sinai, the California Supreme Court
held in Temple Community Hospital v. Superior Court that no cause of action existed
for the intentional spoliation of evidence by third parties. Temple Community Hospital
v. Superior Court, 927 P.2d 223, 224 (Cal. 1999). However, the court was badly divided,
with the author of Cedars-Sinai writing the dissenting opinion. The dissent noted that
third-party spoliation is particularly troubling. See id. at 234-35.
164
The District of Columbia, Montana, and Alabama have recognized a
general tort action for spoliation, but only for nonparties. See, e.g., Oliver, 993 P.2d at
18 (recognizing tort of spoliation of evidence, which may be negligent or intentional, as
“an independent cause of action” with respect to third parties); Smith v. Atkinson, 771
So.2d 429, 432 (Ala. 2000); Continental Ins. Co. v. Herman, 576 So. 2d 313, 315 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1990); Thompson ex rel. Thompson v. Owensby, 704 N.E.2d 134, 136-40
(Ind. Ct. App. 1998). But see Dowdle 831 So.2d at 1135 (refusing to recognize
intentional spoliation of evidence against first- and third-party spoliators as
independent causes of action).
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evidence to preserve it.165 Arguably, this would “outweigh the
owner or custodian’s general right to use, modify, or destroy his
own property.”166 Some courts, understandably, have been
reluctant to find this duty in the absence of a relationship
between the parties or a statutory mandate that the evidence
be maintained for, and accessible to, the plaintiff.167
A second, and perhaps more troubling, problem is
determining the requisite tort element of damages.168 Because
spoliation damages are speculative, courts have struggled to
meet the traditional damages standard under which a plaintiff
must establish the amount of damages with reasonable
certainty.169 In a sense, the jury must “quantify the
unquantifiable.”170 Some jurisdictions reject the tort of
spoliation until resolution of the underlying suit, believing that
the suit’s completion would satisfy the certainty requirement
for damages.171 Other courts have held that damages for
spoliation should not be awarded in addition to damages on the
underlying cause of action.172 Commentators point out, however,

165

See KOESEL, BELL & TURNBULL, supra note 1, at 54.
BELL, KOESEL & TURNBULL, supra note 11, at 783 (citing Ortega v.
Trevino, 983 S.W.2d 219, 222 (Tex. Ct. App. 1997)).
167
See Koplin v. Rosel Well Perforators, Inc., 734 P.2d 1177, 1181-82 (Kan.
1987).
168
Delgado v. Mitchell, 55 S.W.3d 508, 512 (Mo. App. S.D. 2001) (stating that
“a damage award must be based on more than a ‘gossamer web of shimmering
speculation and finely-spun theory.’”); Petrik v. Monarch Printing Corp., 501 N.E.2d
1312, 1320 (Ill. App. Ct. 1986) (noting calculation of damages as most difficult aspect of
spoliation of evidence tort).
169
See W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS
165 (5th ed. 1984) (noting that actual loss is necessary in negligence cases). See also
Foster v. Lawrence Memorial Hosp., 809 F. Supp. 381, 836 (D. Kan. 1992) (applying
Kansas law and finding that plaintiffs’ inability to identify damages arising from
spoliation of evidence that were distinct from those of their underlying malpractice
claim deprived them of the ability to bring an independent action for spoliation).
170
Nolte, supra note 25, at 394, (quoting Chris Goodrich, Gone Today, Here
Tomorrow, CAL. LAW., June 1984, at 15 (quoting California attorney Raoul D.
Kennedy)).
171
See e.g., Federated Mut. Ins. Co. v. Litchfield Precision Components, Inc.,
456 N.W.2d 434, 438 (Minn. 1990); Baugher v. Gates Rubber Co., 863 S.W.2d 905, 913
(Mo. Ct. App. 1993); Petrik, 501 N.E.2d at 1322; Bondu v. Gurvich, 473 So. 2d 1307,
1312 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984). See also Paul Garry Kerkorian, Negligent Spoliation of
Evidence: Skirting the “Suit Within a Suit” Requirement of Legal Malpractice, 41
HASTING L.J. 1077, 1101 (1990) (noting that this requirement, however, might be
considered inconsistent with the spoliation tort as a tort of interference that protects
lost probable expectancies and undermines the nature of the tort as an independent
tort action).
172
Callahan v. Stanley Works, 703 A.2d 1014, 1019 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
1997) (worker’s spoliation damages would have to be reduced by the amount of the
workers compensation lien).
166
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that damages speculative by nature should not per se preclude
a plaintiff from recovery.173 Regardless of the uncertainty of
damages, an injured person should not be denied relief.174
Third, courts rejecting an independent spoliation tort
often stress the “important interest of finality in
adjudication.”175 A spoliation tort may lead to judicial
inefficiency by re-litigating adjudicated issues.176 Recognizing
the tort could also violate long-standing principles of res
judicata and collateral estoppel.177 Arguably, this consequence
only occurs when the spoliation tort is brought after the
underlying action has ended, not when the tort is claimed in
the original action.178 Moreover, if non-tort remedies for
spoliation are sufficient, recognizing a third-party spoliation
tort might have little impact on the interest of finality in
adjudication.179
Despite these arguments challenging the spoliation tort,
the policy considerations of deterrence may provide support for
wider recognition.180 The possibility of punitive damages may do
more to deter and prevent destruction of evidence than
traditional remedies.181 Conversely, allowing punitive damages
could potentially enable a party with an otherwise minimal
claim against the spoliator to recover excessive damages.182
173

See Stipancich, supra note 21, at 1145-46.
Parchment Co. v. Paterson Parchment Paper Co., 282 U.S. 555, 563 (1931)
(“[W]here the tort itself is of such a nature as to preclude the ascertainment of the
amount of damages with certainty, it would be a perversion of fundamental principles
of justice to deny all relief to the injured person, and thereby relieve the wrongdoer
from making any amend for his acts.”). See also Bigelow v. RKO Radio Pictures, 327
U.S. 251, 264- 65 (1946) (recognizing that the most elementary notions of public policy
require the wrongdoer to “bear the risk of the uncertainty” which his own wrong has
established).
175
See, e.g., Dowdle Butane Gas Co., Inc. v. Moore, 831 So. 2d 1124, 1135
(Miss. 2002); Cedars-Sinai Med. Ctr. v. Superior Court, 954 P.2d 511, 515-16 (Cal.
1998) (citing Silberg v. Anderson, 786 P.2d 365, 370 (Cal. 1990).
176
See Celcilia Hallinan, Balancing the Scales After Evidence is Spoiled: Does
Pennsylvania’s Approach Sufficiently Protect the Injured Party? 44 VILL. L. REV. 947,
973-74 (1999).
177
Rubin, supra note 85, at 367.
178
Nolte, supra note 25, at 423.
179
Rubin, supra note 85, at 366-67 (citing Smith v. Superior Court, 198 Cal.
Rptr. 829, 833-34 (Ct. App. 1984)), overruled by Cedars-Sinai Med. Ctr. v. Superior
Court, 954 P.2d 511 (Cal. 1998).
180
See Wilhoit, supra note 37, at 631.
181
See Nesson, supra note 5, at 803; Moskovitz v. Mt. Sinai Medical Ctr., 635
N.E.2d 331, 343 (Ohio 1994) (holding that the “act of altering and destroying records to
avoid liability . . . is particularly deserving of punishment in the form of punitive
damages.”).
182
In fact, in cases involving a defective product, or in any complex litigation,
174
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NEW YORK’S APPROACH TO SPOLIATION

The approach of New York state courts in addressing
spoliation poses two problems. First, the courts do not take the
culpability of a spoliator into account when determining what
sanction to apply. Instead, New York simply asks whether a
particular sanction is fair to the injured party and not unduly
183
prejudicial to the spoliator. This allows the court to fashion
harsh sanctions, such as the adverse inference instruction,
with relative impunity and not according to the culpability of
the spoliator. Second, New York does not recognize the tort of
third-party spoliation. By definition, third parties are not
parties to an underlying suit and therefore are beyond the
reach of tradition remedies for spoliation. Therefore, thirdparty spoliators often go unpunished in New York State.
A.

Use of Traditional Remedies

Historically, New York decisions have applied strong
sanctions even for inadvertent, negligent spoliation of
184
evidence. For example, in Cummings v. Central Tractor Farm
185
& Country Inc., the court noted that a party need not act
intentionally, contumaciously, or in bad faith in connection
with loss or destruction of evidence to impose the ultimate
sanction of striking the party’s pleadings and directing
judgment against it. New York has justified this severe
approach because, as one court noted, it is the “unfairness [in]
allowing a party to destroy evidence and then to benefit from
186
that conduct or omission” that informs such decisionmaking.
This approach, however, produces two troubling consequences.
First, it allows New York to employ any sanction with
relative impunity. Instead of balancing a list of factors, such as
the spoliating party might be a multi-million dollar corporation against whom such a
recovery would be viable. See Robert Walter Thompson, To the Prevailing Party Goes
the Spoils: An Overview of An Emerging Tort in California, 18 W. ST. U. L. REV. 223,
242 (1990).
183
See supra note 72 and accompanying text.
184
See Kirkland v. New York City Hous. Auth., 666 N.Y.S.2d 609, 611 (App.
Div. 1997) (holding that housing authority’s destruction of stove required dismissal of
complaint as spoliation sanction, regardless of whether destruction was intentional or
negligent). See Squitieri v. City of New York, 669 N.Y.S.2d 589, 590 (App. Div. 1998)
(“[D]ismissal [is] warranted when discovery orders were not violated, and even when
the evidence was destroyed prior to the action being filed . . . notwithstanding that the
destruction was not malicious . . . or in bad faith.” (citations omitted)).
185
722 N.Y.S.2d 285, 286 (App. Div. 2001).
186
See Kirkland, 666 N.Y.S.2d at 611.
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187

the spoliator’s motive, as California does, New York simply
asks whether a sanction is fair to the injured party and not
188
unduly prejudicial to the spoliator. Thus, New York courts
have used dismissal, the most severe of all sanctions, in cases
based on merely negligent spoliation. Though this may seem
fair and unprejudicial to New York courts, many other courts
189
would disagree.
Second, New York does not employ any kind of test
before imposing the adverse inference instruction. Instead, it
simply applies the inference if it believes dismissal would be
190
too severe a sanction. In fact, the New York Court of Appeals
has rejected appellants’ claims that the inference was an
191
improper remedy for spoliation. Though the inference may
indeed be less harmful than the more severe sanction of
192
dismissal, its potentially onerous effects have been largely
disregarded by New York courts.
B.

Refusal to Adopt Tort of First-Party Spoliation

Almost all lower New York court decisions and many
federal court decisions interpreting New York state law adhere
to the majority view of courts throughout the country by
193
denying a cause of action for spoliation. The New York
Supreme Court refused to adopt an independent tort for first-

187

See supra text accompanying note 72.
See supra note 70 and accompanying text.
189
See supra text accompanying notes 69-72.
190
Metro. New York Coordinating Council on Jewish Poverty v. FGP Bush
Terminal, Inc., 768 N.Y.S.2d 190, 191 (App. Div, 2002) (Because “disposed-of evidence
was not key to the proof of plaintiff’s case, the supreme court properly exercised its
discretion in limiting its sanction against defendant Allboro for spoliation to an adverse
inference charge.”).
191
Barlow v. Werner Co., 743 N.Y.S.2d 731, 732 (App. Div. 2002) (“Because
the plaintiffs’ spoliation of evidence was unintentional and did not deprive the
appellant of a means of establishing its defense, the Supreme Court providently
exercised its discretion in . . . directing that a negative inference charge be given.”).
192
See supra text and accompanying notes 125-29 (discussing dismissal as
“drastic” sanction).
193
See, e.g., Tiano v. Jacobs, No. 98 Civ. 6229 DC, 2001 WL 225037, at *4
(S.D.N.Y. Mar. 6, 2001); Black Radio Network, Inc. v. NYNEX Corp., 44 F.Supp.2d 565,
586 (S.D.N.Y. 1999); Tietjen v. Hamilton-Beach/Proctor-Silex, Inc., Nos. 97-CV-188 &
97-CV-949, 1998 WL 865586, at *3 (N.D.N.Y Nov. 25, 1998); Whittlesey v. Espy, No. 96
Civ. 0671, 1996 WL 689402, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 26, 1996) (“[P]laintiff cannot allege a
separate cause of action based upon a defendant’s spoliation of evidence.”); Mondello v.
Dun & Bradstreet Corp., No. 94 Civ. 4383, 1996 WL 239890, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. May 9,
1996) (noting that plaintiff cannot “state[ ] a claim for destruction of evidence under
New York law”).
188
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party spoliation of evidence in Pharr v. Cortese. Regardless of
Pharr, plaintiffs continue to bring causes of action for
spoliation in New York and, not surprisingly, most courts have
195
continued rejecting them. For example, in the recent case of
196
Hulett v. Niagara Mohawk Power Corporation, two infant
197
plaintiffs who were struck and injured on railroad tracks
198
sought to assert a cause of action for first-party spoliation.
Plaintiffs claimed that the defendant railroad companies
negligently destroyed dispatcher records relevant to their
199
case. The court found sufficient evidence to prosecute a cause
of action based on negligence, but denied the spoliation claim
200
because no prior relationship existed between the parties.
New York, then, has effectively precluded any plaintiff from
bringing a cause of action based on first-party spoliation.
C.

Modified Recognition of Third-Party Spoliation

However, a few New York cases have acknowledged an
201
independent cause of action for third-party spoliation. Such
cases mainly address the circumstance in which an employer is
sued by his employee for spoliation of evidence and the
resulting impairment of the employee’s suit against a thirdparty tortfeasor. For example, in DiDomenico v. C & S
202
Aeromatik Supplies, Inc., the court allowed the plaintiff to
bring a separate direct cause of action against his employer
where the employer impaired his right to sue a third-party
tortfeasor by destroying all of the evidence. Even under that

194

See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
196
No. 92-7110, 2002 WL 31010983 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Aug 1, 2002).
197
Id. at *1.
198
Id. at *7.
199
The railroad companies were required to keep dispatcher records “for three
years but they destroyed them prior to that date in contravention of their own policy as
well as that of the Interstate Commerce Commission.” Id. at *6.
200
Id. at *8. The court also noted the typical considerations arguing against
the creation of the spoliation tort such as the uncertainty of the existence or extent of
damages; interference with a person’s right to dispose of his property as he chooses;
and inconsistency with policy favoring final judgement. Id. at *8. See also discussion of
separate tort of spoliation supra Part III.
201
See, e.g., Ripepe v. Crown Equip. Corp., 741 N.Y.S.2d 64, 66 (App. Div.
2002); DiDomenico v. C&S Aeromatik Supplies, Inc., 682 N.Y.S.2d 452, 460 (App. Div.
1998); Vaughn v. City of New York, 607 N.Y.S.2d 726 (App. Div. 1994); Weigl v. Quincy
Specialties Co., 601 N.Y.S.2d 774, 776-77 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1993).
202
682 N.Y.S.2d at 460.
195
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line of cases, however, the employer’s duty to preserve evidence
203
is limited.
In the most recent case to recognize third-party
204
spoliation, Fada Industries, Inc. v. Falchi Building Co., L.P.,
the court extended the employer/employee basis for third-party
205
spoliation to that of an insurer/insured relationship. In Fada,
the court held that a cause of action may be asserted by an
insured against his insurer where the insurer allegedly
destroyed evidence crucial to the insured’s defense in the
206
underlying action. However, even if a third-party spoliator is
an insurer, there is no guarantee that a plaintiff will
successfully bring a separate cause of action against such a
207
Nonetheless, absent a special relationship
third party.
between plaintiff and third parties, New York courts are
unwilling to recognize a cause of action for third-party
208
spoliation.

203

Weigl, 601 N.Y.S.2d at 777 (finding that New York does not recognize a
separate tort of spoliation, but does recognize similar common law cause of action in
employment law).
204
730 N.Y.S.2d 827 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2001).
205
Id. A tenant sued the owner and manager of its building and a cotenant to
recover for property damage caused by the cotenant’s leaking water heater. Before
commencement of that action, the cotenant’s insurer took possession of the water
heater, which subsequently was lost or destroyed while in the possession of an agent of
the insurer. The cotenant impleaded its own insurer for its negligent loss of the water
heater, theorizing that such loss had impaired its ability to defend the action and had
prevented it from impleading the entities that negligently manufactured, installed or
repaired the water heater. The insurer moved to dismiss the third-party complaint
against it, but the court denied the motion, thereby sustaining the third-party claim for
negligent spoliation of evidence/impairment of defense. Id. at 831
206
Id. The court in Fada stated that “[t]he facts of [Fada] clearly support
extending the DiDomenico v. C & S Aeromatik Supplies decision, which applies to an
employer-employee relationship, to the insured-insurer relationship, and to the
recognition of a negligent spoliation cause of action under circumstances such as those
presented here.” Id. at 838.
207
Sterbenz v. Attina, 205 F. Supp. 2d 65, 72 (E.D.N.Y. 2002). Plaintiff sued
the insurer and one of its claims agents, alleging spoliation of evidence and impairment
of her products liability claim against the manufacturer of the car. The court for the
Eastern District of New York granted the insurer’s motion for summary judgment
dismissing the action, declaring any claim for spoliation of evidence groundless under
New York law and determining the insurer’s conduct to have been reasonable in any
event. See id. at 71-73.
208
See generally Steinman v. Barclays Bank, 715 N.Y.S.2d 841 (App. Div.
2000), dismissing appeal from, 727 N.Y.S.2d 695 (2001) (rejecting on the facts an
independent claim against Barclays Bank for intentionally withholding certain
presumably canceled travelers' checks from third-party plaintiff).

2/16/2005 2:38:18 PM

1076

BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 70:3

V.

PROPOSALS

A.

Use of Spoliator’s Culpability When Determining
Sanctions and Applying Adverse Inference Instruction

New York state courts might consider refining their
approach to spoliation through greater consideration of the
particular facts and circumstances of a given case. First, New
York state courts should take the spoliators’s culpability into
account when fashioning a spoliation remedy. For example,
New York federal courts consider the culpability of a spoliator
as one of the most important factors in determining whether
209
sanctions for spoliation are appropriate. This means that a
negligent spoliator would be much less likely to receive a harsh
sanction, such as dismissal, than an intentional spoliator.
Second, New York state courts should apply a test
before applying the adverse inference instruction. In New York
federal courts, for example, the party seeking the instruction
must establish the following three elements: (1) that the party
having control over the evidence had an obligation to preserve
it at the time it was destroyed; (2) that the records were
destroyed with a “culpable state of mind”; and (3) that the
destroyed evidence was “relevant” to the party’s claim or
defense such that a reasonable trier of fact could find that it
210
would support that claim or defense. A “culpable state of
mind” for purposes of a spoliation inference includes ordinary
211
negligence.
When the destruction is negligent, relevance must be
212
proven by the party seeking the inference. When evidence is
destroyed in bad faith (i.e., intentionally or willfully), on the
other hand, that fact alone is sufficient to demonstrate
213
relevance. By adopting a test similar to New York’s federal
courts for the adverse inference instruction, state courts would

209

Gates Rubber Co. v. Bando Chem. Indus., 167 F.R.D. 90, 102 (D. Colo.
1996) (“Two of the factors . . . have taken on greater importance in most of the cases on
sanctions for spoliation: (1) the culpability of the offender, or the alleged mental state
which gave rise to the destruction of evidence, and (2) the degree of prejudice or harm
which resulted from the actions of the offender.”).
210
See Byrnie v. Town of Cromwell, Bd. of Educ., 243 F.3d 93, 107-08 (2d Cir.
2001).
211
See Residential Funding Corp. v. DeGeorge Fin. Corp., 306 F.3d 99, 108
(2d Cir. 2002).
212
Id.
213
Id. at 109.
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employ a more tailored and appropriate remedy, especially for
negligent spoliators.
Finally, if New York is unwilling to apply such a test, it
should at least require intent instead of negligence for the
adverse inference instruction. In fact, few states besides New
214
York have expanded the inference to negligent spoliation.
Were the inference merely remedial, as some commentators
assume, then it might be a more appropriate remedy for a
215
negligent offender. Ultimately, New York’s spoliation remedy
should more closely correspond to the spoliator’s culpability or
216
scienter.
B.

Broader Recognition for Third Party Spoliation Tort

New York must also recognize a broader tort of thirdparty spoliation. By limiting the tort to third parties who are
employers or certain insurers, New York risks allowing the
destruction of evidence by other classes of third parties to go
unchecked. Furthermore, the state’s refusal to recognize a tort
for first-party intentional or negligent spoliation certainly does
not preclude it from recognizing a tort for third-party
spoliation. Thus, the court’s recent statement in Metlife Auto &
Home v. Joe Basil Chevrolet, Inc. that “it stands to reason that
those courts that do not recognize [a tort for intentional or
negligent spoliation] against a first party likewise would not
217
recognize one against a third party” is unreasonable. Because
sanctions may not be levied upon a disinterested, independent
third party, an independent tort action for third-party
spoliation of evidence is the only means to deter the third-party
destruction of evidence and to compensate the aggrieved party.
Moreover, if courts believe that “[n]on-tort remedies for
spoliation are sufficient in the vast majority of cases,” then
recognition of a third-party spoliation tort will have little
218
overall impact on the interest of finality in adjudication.

214

See, e.g., Farrell v. Connetti Trailer Sales, Inc., 727 A.2d 183, 186 (R.I.
1999); Lagalo v. Allied Corp., 592 N.W.2d 786, 789 (Mich. Ct. App. 1999); Squitieri v.
City of New York, 669 N.Y.S.2d 589, 590 (App. Div. 1998). Several federal circuit courts
of appeal have followed suit. See supra notes 97-99 and accompanying text.
215
Dropkin, supra note 87, at 1828.
216
See Peltz, supra note 44, at 1336.
217
753 N.Y.S.2d 272, 276 (App. Div. 2002).
218
See Dowdle Butane Gas Co. v. Moore, 831 So. 2d 1124, 1130, 1135 (Miss.
2002).
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Unjust consequences will follow New York’s refusal to
expand the tort for third-party spoliation. Absent a third-party
spoliation tort, the integrity of New York’s judicial system
219
could be jeopardized. When evidence helpful to one party is
220
absent, courts cannot administer even-handed justice.
Recognizing a tort for third-party spoliation would reduce
spoliation by putting businesses, governmental entities, and
individuals on notice that if they destroy evidence, serious
221
consequences could result. This effect would promote “an
individual’s due process right to have one’s grievances heard by
a court of competent jurisdiction utilizing all relevant
222
evidence.” When squarely presented with this issue, New
York courts would be wise to give serious consideration to the
reasoning of jurisdictions that have recognized a tort for thirdparty spoliation. To do otherwise risks inviting destruction of
relevant evidence by third parties and the perception that
“individual due process rights are unimportant or are somehow
223
being trampled by the judicial system itself.”

James T. Killelea

219

†

See Callahan v. Stanley Works, 703 A.2d 1014, 1017 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law

Div. 1997).
220

Id. (stating that spoliation “creates enormous costs for both the victimized
party and the judicial system, prevents fair and proper adjudication of the issues, and
interferes with the administration of justice.”).
221
Id.
222
Id. (citing Spencer, supra note 4, at 63).
223
Id. at 1018.
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